The Impact of Pacifica Foundation on Two Traditions of Freedom of Expression (with Endress) by Gard, Stephen W
Cleveland State University 
EngagedScholarship@CSU 
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship 
1978 
The Impact of Pacifica Foundation on Two Traditions of Freedom 
of Expression (with Endress) 
Stephen W. Gard 
Cleveland State University, s.gard@csuohio.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
Original Citation 
Stephen W. Gard, The Impact of Pacifica Foundation on Two Traditions of Freedom of Expression (with 
Endress), 27 Cleveland State Law Review 465 (1978) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of 
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu. 
Citation: 27 Clev. St. L. Rev.  465 1978 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Mon May 21 15:17:03 2012
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
ARTICLES
THE IMPACT OF Pacifica Foundation ON TWO
TRADITIONS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
STEPHEN W. GARD* AND JEFFREY ENDREssf
I. INTRODUCTION
T HERE EXIST IN THIS NATION TWO TRADITIONS of freedom of expression:
"that of the written and spoken word and that of the broadcast word."'
The contrast between these two traditions is extraordinary. The first has its
roots in the historic rejection of administrative licensing of the written word
2
and the popular repudiation of the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798.3 This
tradition regards prior restraints as virtually verboten4 and all governmental
regulation of the content of expression as inherently suspect.5 In short, here
freedom of speech is the rule and governmental regulation is an exception to
be jealously confined within narrow, judicially defined, limits.
Anomalously, the tradition of broadcast expression in this nation has been
precisely the opposite. It is a tradition of administrative licensing and
governmental regulation of the content of expression by the Federal
Communications Commission. Indeed, the powers of the FCC have never
been judicially limited: "What has been missing in the controversy over FCC
control is a precedent setting the outer boundaries of that control and
establishing something that the Commission cannot do .. .6
The two traditions of freedom of expression have not coexisted easily.
There has never been a definitive answer to whether the differential treatment
of broadcast expression is attributable to anything more substantial than the
historical accident which led to the creation of the Federal Communications
Commission,7 nor have the Supreme Court's efforts to identify a rational
* B.A., DePauw University; J.D., Indiana University, Indianapolis Law School; LL.M.,
University of Chicago; Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law.
f B.A., Indiana University; Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
class of 1980.
'Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW & ECON. 15, 15
(1967).
2 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
3 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A
Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
4 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
1 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580-88 (1978).
6 Kalven, supra note 1, at 37-38 (emphasis in original).
7 The Federal Radio Commission, predecessor agency to the Federal Communications
Commission, was created in 1927 after judicial rulings that the Department of Commerce had no
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ground for the anomalous status of broadcasting been profitable. 8 The
inescapable conclusion seems to be that while the argument that the air waves
constitute a scarce public resource is inadequate to distinguish the electronic
and print media,9 nevertheless administrative regulation of broadcast
expression is permissible even though similar regulation of the print media
would be violative of the first amendment.'0
The United States Supreme Court, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation," had a
magnificent opportunity to either begin the process of defining first
amendment limitations on the scope of the authority of the FCC to regulate
the content of broadcast expression, explicate a rational ground for the
differential status of broadcasting, or perhaps both. Indeed, it could be argued
that Pacifica was potentially the broadcast media's "own Zenger case."'
2
The Pacifica case arose when WBAI-FM, a New York City radio station,
broadcast a program analyzing contemporary societal attitudes about
language which included a monologue by humorist George Carlin13
concerning "the words you couldn't say on the public . . . airwaves . . .
ever . ". ."14 The satirical monologue, which involved the repeated use of
each of these seven words, was broadcast at 2 o'clock on a Tuesday afternoon
in October 1973, following warnings that it contained sensitive language
which some might find offensive. 15 The monologue was a selection from a
phonograph record, "George Carlin, Occupation: FOOLE," available for
purchase by both adults and children at most record stores. Several weeks
statutory authority to refuse broadcast licenses even for the technical purpose of preventing
overlapping signals and interference. The resulting chaos gave rise to the creation of the
administrative agency to restore order through the device of licensing. See Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,375-77 (1969); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,212-14
(1943).
8 See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
9 See, e.g., B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 90-92, 103-08 (1975); Van Alstyne, The Mbius Strip of the First Amendment:
Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.L. REV. 539 (1978); Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public
Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976);
Coase, Evaluation of Public Policy Relating to Radio and Television Broadcasting: Social and
Economic Issues, 41 LAND ECON. 161 (1965).
10 Compare Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) with Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
11 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Other articles focusing on the Pacifica decision include: The Supreme
Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5,148-63 (1978); 52 TEMP. L. Q. 170 (1979);47 U. CIN. L. REV.
678 (1978).
For a discussion of the effects the Pacifica decision is likely to have on cable television
programming, see 9 CUM. L. REv. 811 (1979).
12 See generally Kalven, supra note 1, at 18. John Peter Zenger, a newspaper publisher, was
tried in the State of New York on August 4, 1735, for seditious libel, having published various
articles highly critical of the British governor of New York. Although his argument was contrary
to precedent, and was not accepted until 1805, Zenger's attorney argued that truth was a'defense
to libel, winning acquittal for his client. While the actual importance of the Zenger case has been
questioned, it is considered to be symbolic as part of the foundation for the freedom of press
embodied in the first amendment. J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF
JOHN PETER ZENCER (2d ed. 1972).
13 Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI-FM, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 95 (1975).
14 Id. at 100 (appendix). The seven words are shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker,
and tits. Id.
15 Id. at 95-96.
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later the FCC received a complaint from a man who heard the broadcast
while driving with his fifteen-year-old son, 16 the only complaint received by
either the radio station or the FCC.' 7 Thereafter the FCC issued a Declara-
tory Order finding the broadcast of the words "patently offensive" and, while
not "obscene," nevertheless "indecent" and hence violative of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 which proscribes the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane
language."'" The FCC made it clear that its Order constituted a flat ban on
the use of such words on the broadcast media, subject to the qualifications
that "[w]hen the number of children in the audience is reduced to a mini-
mum, for example during the late evening hours" the material might be
"redeemed by a claim that it has literary, artistic, political or scientific
value."19 The FCC justified its Order on the grounds that broadcasts enter
the home where the privacy of unconsenting adults and the protection of
children from such words are legitimate concerns to be given primacy over
the first amendment interests at stake. 20 The FCC Order was reversed by
a divided panel of the United States court of appeals.
21
The decision of the court of appeals was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court, with four Justices dissenting. 22 The majority opinion, written
by Mr. Justice Stevens, held that the broadcast of the Carlin monologue was
"indecent" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and that that statutory
term had a separate and distinct meaning from the statutory term "obscene.."
2 3
In Justice Stevens' view "indecent" encompassed any word the use of which
was in "nonconformance with accepted standards of morality."2 4 The
majority also found that the Order did not violate the statutory prohibition of
censorship by the FCC because it did not constitute a prior restraint.
25
Finally, the majority held that the Order did not violate the freedom of speech
clause of the first amendment because the FCC's proscription of the
16 Id. at 95.
17 Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
,s 56 F.C.C.2d at 96, 99.
'9 Id. at 98. In a letter clarification the FCC stated that the order was "issued in a specific
factual context" and refused to comment on hypothetical situations which might arise in the
future. The FCC did suggest that it would not consider the order applicable to "public
events . . .covered live [where] there is no opportunity for journalistic editing." Pacifica
Foundation, Station WBAI-FM, 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 n.1 (1976).
10 56 F.C.C.2d at 97. The Commission also attempted to utilize the scarcity of airwaves
argument to justify its order. Id. This argument was ignored by the Supreme Court. See FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 770 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21 Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Circuit Judge Leventhal dis-
sented. Id. at 30.
11 J.J. Stewart, Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented on the ground that " 'indecent' should
probably be read as meaning no more than 'obscene,' " and that 18 U.S.C. § 1464 should be
construed to prohibit only the broadcast of language which is "obscene," in order to avoid the
difficult constitutional issues which otherwise would be raised. The Carlin monologue was
conceded not to be "obscene." FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 778 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). J.J. Brennan and Marshall also dissented on first amendment grounds. Id. at 762.
23 Id. at 740-41.
24 Id. at 740.
11 Id. at 735-38. The Court traced the legislative history of the censorship provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1464, and concluded that"[t]he prohibition
against censorship unequivocally denies the Commission any power to edit proposed broadcasts
in advance ..." although the Commission does retain the power to "review the content of the
completed broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory duties." Id. at 735.
1978]
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broadcast of "indecent" language on a uniquely pervasive medium of
expression was justified by the governmental interests in protecting juveniles
and unwilling adults who might be exposed to the language.
26
The purpose of this article is not to debate the wisdom of the use of
sensitive language on the electronic media or elsewhere. The admonition that
the perceived wisdom of governmental regulations should never be confused
with the issue of their constitutionality remains appropriate.2 7 Nor is it our
purpose to debate the substantive question of whether the Court reached the
proper result in Pacifica, although we will necessarily have much to say by
implication on this issue. The purpose of this article is rather to assess the
impact of Pacifica on the two traditions of freedom of expression which
continue to coexist uneasily in our nation. An assessment of the impact of
Pacifica is of particular importance because "[i]t is characteristic of the
freedoms of expression in general that they are vulnerable to gravely
damaging yet barely visible encroachments.
'" 28
Our concern is not primarily the narrow holding of the Supreme Court,
but rather the fact that, in reaching its conclusion, the Court failed to delineate
any limitations whatsoever on the power of the FCC to control the content of
broadcast expression. After Pacifica this country remains without a judicial
pronouncement from its highest court of anything the Federal Com-
munications Commission cannot do. Indeed, in the eyes of the concurring
Justices, what had heretofore been a matter of established first amendment
jurisprudence has now become something the FCC "should consider . . .
as it develops standards in this area."
29
The impact of Pacifica on the tradition of non-broadcast expression is also
a matter of grave concern. In the extraordinarily harsh language of Justice
Brennan, the Pacifica majority was engaged in nothing less than an "attempt to
unstitch the warp and woof of First Amendment law."30 Justice Brennan's
statement cannot be dismissed as the rhetoric of a dissenter. The two
concurring Justices, whose votes were necessary to the holding that the
broadcast of Carlin's monologue was not constitutionally protected,
specifically rejected Justice Stevens' rationale that the level of first
amendment protection should vary depending upon a judicial assessment of
the value of the particular speech.3 1 On the other hand, the result in Pacifica
could not be justified, in the view of Justice Stevens, unless the first
26 Id. at 748-51. Radio broadcasts confront the citizen, "not only in public, but also in the
privacy of the home [or car], where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the
First Amendment rights of an intruder"; where any individual, adult or juvenile, may unwittingly
tune in to hear such "indecent" language. Id. at 748. Although five members of the Court
concurred in this constitutional conclusion, there was a split within the majority as to the proper
underlying rationale. Thus, in parts IV-A and IV-B of his opinion, Justice Stevens spoke for
himself, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 742-48. Justices Powell and Blackmun
concurred specially in order to disassociate themselves from these portions of Stevens' opinion
and state their own rationale for reaching the same conclusion on the constitutional questions. Id.
at 755.
27 See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
2' Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
2S 438 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
30 Id. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring).
[Vol. 27:465
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amendment interests were denigrated by a judicial finding that the particular
expression was less valuable than the speech involved in prior cases.A2 Simply
stated, the result in Pacifica was dependent upon a combination of two
rationales, neither of which a majority of the Court would find constitutionally
appropriate. In spite of this, it is clear that Pacifica casts doubt on a large body
of first amendment precedent, even though little effort was made by either
Justice Stevens or Justice Powell to distinguish past cases. This is a matter of
particular concern inasmuch as the Supreme Court has, at least on one recent
occasion, adopted a last in time, first in right approach to its own precedentA3
This article will first discuss the nature and extent of FCC regulation of
broadcast expression which remains intact following Pacifica. Therafter it
will analyze the issues raised by the mode of statutory construction utilized by
the majority in Pacifica. Finally, the first amendment doctrines which have
been affected by the rationales offered by the prevailing opinions will be
critically examined.
II. THE REGULATORY BACKGROUND IGNORED IN Pacifica
The Supreme Court confined its review in Pacifica to the narrow issue of
whether "the Carlin monologue was indecent as broadcast." 4 In support of
this limited scope of judicial review it was argued that the FCC's Order was an
adjudication as opposed to the promulgation of a rule or regulation, 35 that the
Court should limit its review in order to avoid the unnecessary decision of
constitutional issues, 36 and that any chilling effect on broadcasters would be
minimal,37 or in any event, would deter only offensive language "at the
periphery of First Amendment concern." 38 In addition, Justice Powell
believed that "this narrow focus also is conducive to the orderly development
of this relatively new and difficult area of law, in the first instance by the
Commission, and then by the reviewing courts."39
There are sound objections to each of the proffered justifications for
narrowly limiting the scope of judicial review to the specific holding of the
FCC. The FCC clearly treated its Order as the promulgation of a general
standard suitable for future application.40 Since the Supreme Court itself has
32 Id. at 745 & n.20.
3' In Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1976), the Court announced that Amal-
gamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968),
had been overruled by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), despite the fact that Lloydhad
carefully, if painfully, distinguished Logan Valley Plaza.
34 438 U.S. at 742,744. This theme appears throughout the majority opinion, id. at 734,741 and
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, id. at 755,'760, 761 n.4 (Powell, J. concurring).
3- Id. at 734; id. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
36 Id. at 734; id. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring).
31 Id. at 743 & n.18; id. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 743.
39 Id. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring).
40 Thus, the Order stated that it was intended "to clarify the standards which the Commission
utilizes to judge 'indecent language' " and to "permit all persons who consider themselves
aggrieved or who wish to call additional factors to the Commission's attention to seek
reconsideration." Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI-FM, 56 F.C.C.2d 94,99 (1975). Indeed, this
was precisely the reason why the FCC issued a declaratory order rather than imposing direct
sanctions on Pacifica Foundation. Id. See also REPORT ON THE BROADCAST OF VIOLENT, INDECENT,
1978]
HeinOnline  -- 27 Clev. St. L. Rev.  469 1978
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
recognized the ease with which administrative agencies can abuse the
distinction between adjudication and rulemaking, 41 the Court's reliance on
dubious formality in characterizing the Order in Pacifica seems especially
inappropriate. And even if the Order in Pacifica was correctly deemed to be
adjudicative, such a characterization hardly relieves the Court from the
strictures of the Chenery doctrine which requires that an administrative
adjudication be reversed, even if correctly decided, if the agency's rationales
for its decision are incorrect. 42 While the avoidance of unnecessarily deciding
constitutional issues is certainly an honored principle, it is myopic to apply it
where the result would be to uphold an agency order which promises to raise
more constitutional questions in future cases than the first decision will avoid.
And, in order to determine whether such is the case, a sensitive consideration
of the full import of the administrative regulation is essential. The refusal to
apply the overbreadth doctrine in Pacifica is also questionable. When the
governmental regulation is aimed at the content of the expression, as it was in
Pacifica, the overbreadth doctrine has traditionally been enforced in its full
vigor.43 Further, the extent and area of impact of any chilling effect on
broadcasters as a result of Pacifica can hardly be confidently predicted
without an inquiry into the regulatory background underlying the FCC's
action. Finally, the argument of Justice Powell that a narrowly focused scope
of review is conducive to the proper development of this area of
governmental speech control is dependent upon the accuracy of his assertion
that the "Commission may be expected to proceed cautiously, as it has in the
past."44 This can be determined only by a consideration of the history of the
FCC in exercising its authority to regulate sensitive language. Ultimately the
problem of the Court's narrow focus in Pacifica was not that it limited its
decision to the specific facts of the case, but, rather that by ignoring the
regulatory background and the full import of the FCC's asserted authority,
the Court decided the case in a vacuum divorced from "the realities of the
relationship between the Federal Communications Commission and radio
licensees.
45
An appreciation of the true impact of the Supreme Court's decision in
Pacifica must begin with an understanding of the expansive and
bureaucratically inscrutable regulatory scheme adminstered by the FCC. The
FCC traditionally has claimed two sources of statutory authority for its
control over the broadcast of material it deems unsuitable. First, the FCC has
invoked an asserted power to enforce the prohibition, found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464, of the use of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
AND OBSCENE MATERIAL, 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975). The FCC's comment, upon reconsideration, that
the Order was issued in a "specific factual context" should hardly change the analysis inasmuch as
the FCC recognized that the Order was intended to apply to many situations which might arise in
the future. Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI-FM, 59 F.C.C.2d 892, 893 (1976).
41 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
42 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
43 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
4 438 U.S. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
4 Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Bazelon, C. J., dissenting). For a discussion of this relationship, see id. at 407.
[Vol. 27:465
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radio communications."46 Second, the agency has relied upon its general
authority to regulate broadcasting in the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity."'"
This potentially far-reaching power of the FCC to regulate the content of
broadcast expression is encouraged by the Supreme Court's refusal to
consider what limits, if any, exist to govern the FCC's application of the
public interest criteria.48 In the past the Court, in other contexts, has construed
the scope of the FCC's authority to regulate under the public interest standard
very broadly.49 Despite some indications to the contrary, 50 the FCC has relied
on these precedents to justify an expansive application of the public interest
standard to broadcast expression it finds unseemly.51
The major threat to freedom of expression, however, is not the breadth of
the FCC's substantive public interest criteria, although this too is a matter of
serious concern, but is rather two corollary applications of the standard. First,
the Commission requires each broadcaster to exercise a stringent self-
censorship by mandating that he ascertain the content of all material
broadcast and, second, adopt a policy governing the suitability of material
for airplay. Thus, in its public notice concerning the responsibility of licensees
to review records before allowing them to be broadcast,52 the Commission,
while not declaring the playing of "drug-oriented songs" to be contrary to the
public interest, nevertheless mandated that the public interest required that
broadcasters ascertain the content of each and every song before airplay in
order to determine "drug-orientation." 53 If the broadcaster violates his own
policy concerning the suitability of material for broadcast, the violation of the
station's policy is deemed to be violative of the public interest even if the
material broadcast is itself not inappropriate under that standard.54 The
46 See, e.g., Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 57 F.C.C.2d 782 (1975); Pacifica Foundation, Station
WBAI-FM, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975); Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 777
(1973).
17 18 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970). See, e.g., Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI-FM, 56 F.C.C.2d 94
(1975); WUHY-FM, Eastern Educational Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970); Jack Straw Memorial
Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970).
48 438 U.S.at 739 n.13.
41 See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943).
50 See, e.g., WUHY-FM, Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d at 412-13 (public interest criteria
identical to 18 U.S.C. § 1464 criteria); Complaint of Oliver R. Grace, 22 F.C.C.2d 667,668 (1970)
("The charge that the broadcast programs are vulgar or presented without 'due regard for
sensitivity, intelligence, and taste', is not properly cognizable by this Government agency.");
Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147 (1964) (FCC will not ban provocative programming which
might offend some listeners).
51 See, e.g., Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970); Palmetto Broadcasting
Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962); Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960).
52 License Responsibility to Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d409 (1971),
aff'd sub nom. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Id. See also WUHY-FM, Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d408 (1970) (holding a licensee to
be grossly negligent for failing to prevent the airing of profanities contained in a taped interview);
Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960) (applying a sanction against a licensee which
knowingly permitted a speaker to continue making suggestive remarks); Report and Statement
of Policy Res: Commission en bane Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2310 (1960).
54 See, e.g., Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970); Pacifica Foundation,
6 Rad. Reg. (P-F) 570 (1965).
19781
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combination of these administratively created principles, which permit a
licensee to be found to have acted contrary to the public interest if he either
fails to ascertain the content of all material broadcast (surely an impossible
requirement), fails to have an adequate policy on the matter, or violates his
own "voluntarily" adopted policy, gives the FCC carte blanche to control the
content of broadcast expression.
The nature and scope of the remedial powers at the disposal of the FCC
further exacerbate the problem of administrative supervision of the content
of broadcast expression. One of the remedies available to the FCC is the
power to impose a forfeiture or monetary penalty upon a licensee for the
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464. 5- While the FCC continues to utilize this
sanction, 56 its use has been judicially condemned because it fails to afford the
licensee the procedural safeguards which are required by the first
amendment.57 Similarly, the FCC's authority to revoke 58 or suspend 59 the
license of a broadcaster who violates the FCC's conception of material
suitable for broadcast is also subject to the criticism that procedures required
by the first amendment are ignored. Thus, for example, the FCC's procedures
make no provision for a prompt judicial determination of the constitutional
status of the material broadcast, and the burden of seeking judicial review of
an agency determination is placed on the licensee rather than the censoring
administrative body.
60
Perhaps the most important procedural safeguard lacking in the FCC
procedure is one which has never been specifically mentioned in the first
amendment context by either courts or commentators. Common to the
operation of all FCC sanctions for the broadcast of material deemed
unsuitable by the agency is a lack of separation of functions.6' The FCC
commissioners act as investigators, prosecutors, and judges. Such a lack of
separation of functions was a common feature of administrative licensing
schemes condemned in the past and drastically increases the propensity to
adverse decision, one of the core objections to systems of prior restraint.
62
The most potent sanction for the broadcast of material deemed to
be unsuitable by the Commission is the agency's authority to deny license
renewal to the offending broadcaster.6 3 This sanction too is woefully
inadequate in its provision of procedural safeguards. The nonrenewal
sanction lacks all the safeguards which likewise are absent in the forfeiture,
license revocation, and suspension proceedings. In addition, the burden of
proof that renewal would be in the public interest is on the broadcaster,
6 4
47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1976).
56 See Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 57 F.C.C.2d 782 (1975).
57 Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
- 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1976).
59 Id. § 303(m) (i).
60 See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Blount v. Rizzi, 400
U.S. 410 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
61 See generally K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 254-70 (3d ed. 1972).
62 See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CoNTE mp. PROB. 648 (1955).
47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
64 Id. § 309(e). See Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Charles P. B. Pinson, Inc. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1963); KFKB
Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
[Vol. 27:465
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despite the fact that, in the nonbroadcast context, the Supreme Court has
made it plain that the first amendment requires that the censoring agency
carry the burden of proof.6 5 As important as these procedural deficiencies are,
it is inappropriate to focus on them exclusively. The most important objection
to the renewal sanction of the FCC is not formalistic but realistic.
The blunt reality is that a broadcaster needs a license from the
Commission to remain in business. The FCC license is thus the broadcaster's
most valuable commercial asset; indeed, the value of the broadcaster's other
assets are contingent upon the continued possession of a license from the
FCC. Such licenses are, by statute, limited to a maximum duration of three
years. 66 At the end of each three year period the FCC will renew the license if
the broadcaster carries the burden of proof of operation in the public
interest. 67 Most licenses are summarily renewed without FCC scrutiny, but
every programming complaint received by the Commission is forwarded to
the licensee for comment and, regardless of how frivolous, is placed in the
licensee's file for possible agency consideration at renewal time. Thus, the
broadcaster is continually reminded by the Commission of its power to
require costly renewal hearings and deny renewal if the broadcaster has failed
to adhere to the agency's conception of the public interest.68 It is not surprising
that it has been remarked that the FCC dossiers "bear a haunting analogy to
the FBI files on individuals during the hey-day of the loyalty programs in the
'fifties.' "69
The practical effect of the FCC's power to deny renewal has been
explained as follows:
[T]he renewal process has become the primary method through
which the Commission exercises day-by-day control over virtually
all broadcast operations, and particularly over program practices
and program operations. Thus, the fact that the licensee must go
through the trial and prove himself every three years is in a very real
sense a "Sword of Damocles" over the broadcaster's head. If the
Sword does not often fall, neither is it ever lifted and the in terrorem
effect of the sword's presence enables the Commission to exercise
far-reaching powers of control over the licensee's operations.
7 0
As a result of this in terrorem effect of the threat of FCC utilization of the
nonrenewal sanction, the agency is empowered, in reality, to further control
the content of broadcast expression by the use of numerous informal methods
which have been termed "regulation by the lifted eyebrow."7 1 Thus, the
Commission can, and does, exercise far-reaching control over the content of
broadcast expression by informal methods such as public speeches by
65 See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Blount v. Rizzi, 400
U.S. 410 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958).
66 47 U.S.C. § 307(c) (1976).
67 Id.
66 Kalven, supra note 1, at 21.
69 Id.
70 Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and
Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 119 (1967).
71 Miami Broadcasting Co., Station WQAM, 14 Rad. Reg. (P-F) 125, 128 (1956) (Com-
missioner Doerfer, dissenting).
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commissioners and letters and telephone calls from the commissioners or
their staff to stations indicating precisely what the Commission likes or dislikes
about the station's programming. It was in this manner, for example, that the
Commission bludgeoned all three major television networks into adopting the
"Family Viewing" hour. 2
The effect of the FCC's methods has cast a pervasive pall of self-
censorship over broadcast expression, with the licensees almost invariably
bowing to Commission dictates. Entire programs are cancelled, 73 broad
categories of material, including much that is unobjectionable, are removed
from the air waves,7 4 and programming policies are adopted by broad-
casters75 in response to FCC wishes. The Commission's view of this self-
censorship can most charitably be described as indifference:
The fact that Sonderling [Broadcasting Corp.] has abandoned its
sex-talk show and alleges that other stations may have done the same
thing is not disturbing in itself.
If the licensee goes beyond the requirements of the law and
drops sexual material altogether, as Sonderling says he did here, that
is an act of licensee judgment. We assume that the licensee takes into
consideration the tastes, needs and interests of his community in
making this judgment. We take no position as to whether
Sonderling's dropping of the program was good or bad, or whether
it was or was not in the public interest.
76
This FCC power to control the content of broadcast expression is virtually
immunized from judicial review for three interrelated reasons. First, the
economic value of a broadcast license is so great that "faced with the threat of
economic injury, the licensee will choose in many cases to avoid controversial
speech in order to forestall that injury."77 Second, the FCC renewal
procedure, in which the broadcaster bears the burden of proof that his overall
past performance has been in the public interest, tends to preclude judicial
review of any particular incident or programming decision.7 8 Finally, the
FCC has traditionally followed an invidious policy of selective enforcement
which exacerbates the first two factors. It invariably proceeds formally
72 Compare Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Calif. 1976)
(holding FCC tactics unconstitutional) with REPORT ON TME BROADCAST OF VioLENT, INDECENT,
AND OBSCENE MATERIAL, 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975) (FCC's self-satisfied description of effectiveness
of its tactics).
73 See, e.g., Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 57 F.C.C.2d 782 (1975); Sonderling Broadcasting
Corp., WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (1973); WUHY-FM, Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408
(1970).
"' See Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting).
75 See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Calif. 1976).
71 Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., WGLD-FM, 41 F.C.C.2d at 783-84.
77 Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
71 See Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC Regulatory
Standards, 84 Hsv. L. REv. 664,669 (1971); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77
HLv. L. REv. 700, 703 (1964).
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against small, noncommercial stations which cannot afford to litigate the
legality of the FCC's action, thus assuring that the standards which the agency
applies informally against the larger commercial stations and networks are
formally established virtually by default.7 9
The Supreme Court in Pacifica completely ignored the regulatory
framework in which the case arose. In striking contrast, in the arena of
nonbroadcast expression, the Court has held that the very existence of such an
informal censorship scheme, superimposed upon a formal regulatory
procedure and largely obviating the need for the formal regulatory
procedure, is violative of the first amendment.8 0 It need not be argued that the
Court in Pacifica should have rendered a broad holding that the FCC
regulatory process for controlling the content of broadcast expression is
wholly unconstitutional. The more fundamental flaw of Pacifica was that the
Court not only ignored the vices of the FCC regulatory process but assumed,
contrary to reality, that there was no danger of any undue inhibition of
broadcast expression81 and that the agency would proceed cautiously in the
future, mindful of first amendment limitations on its authority.8 2 The Court
then relied on these dubious factual assumptions to justify not only its refusal
to invoke the overbreadth doctrine but also to rationalize its disregard of the
regulatory framework in its construction of the statutes governing the FCC's
action in Pacifica. What the Court did was nothing less than "deciding great
issues in a vacuum and giving us a parody of legal wisdom."8 3 As a result, the
power of the FCC to control the content of broadcast expression remains
completely free of judicially imposed limits.
III. TnE STATUTORY CONSTRucTION IssuEs
When freedom of expression issues are present, the principle that statutes
should be construed in such a manner as to avoid raising questions as to their
constitutionality historically has assumed a special importance. The first
amendment guarantee of freedom of expression embodies a fundamental
legal principle designed to serve as an explicit limitation on the exercise of
governmental authority. But this is not the only purpose of the first
amendment. It also constitutes a legal manifestation of a long and honorable
tradition of unfettered expression by the people of a free country. This
tradition traces its existence to the very establishment of the United States as a
free and independent nation, an event which would not have occurred absent
the caustic, unpleasant, and even indecent propaganda efforts of the founding
fathers.
8 4
There followed a period of over one hundred years during which, with
11 See WUHY-FM, Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 423 (1970) (Commissioner
Johnson, dissenting); Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833, 838-39 (1970)
(Commissioner Cox, dissenting).
10 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
81 438 U.S. at 743. See also id. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
82 Id. at 761 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
83 H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 85 (1965).
84 See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967);
P. DAVIDSON, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1941).
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one exception, there existed no federal legislation regulating the expressive
activities of a free people. The one exception was the hated Alien and Sedition
Act of 1798, and the popular reaction to this repressive measure only
enhanced the national tradition that expression should be "uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open."85 Thus, Professor Chafee has said of the first
amendment:
[I]t is much more than an order to Congress not to cross the
boundary which marks the extreme limits of lawful suppression. It is
also an exhortation and a guide for the action of Congress inside that
boundary. It is a declaration of national policy in favor of public
discussion of all public questions. Such a declaration should make
Congress reluctant and careful in the enactment of all restrictions
upon utterance, even though the courts will not refuse to enforce
them as unconstitutional.
86
While the Supreme Court has consistently honored this national tradition
by construing statutes to avoid the "constitutional danger zone" marked by
the first amendment,8 7 the most eloquent statement of the principle is that of
Learned Hand:
It would contradict the normal assumption of democratic govern-
ment that the suppression of hostile criticism does not turn upon the
justice of its substance or the decency and propriety of its temper.
Assuming that the power to repress such opinion may rest in
Congress in the throes of a struggle for the very existence of the state,
its exercise is so contrary to the use and wont of our people that only
the clearest expression of such a power justifies the conclusion that it
was intended.
88
This principle of statutory construction was unfortunately dishonored by
the Supreme Court majority in Pacifica. Justice Stevens, who had so carefully
limited the focus of judicial review to the precise factual holding of the FCC
in order to avoid the unnecessary decision of constitutional issues, ignored the
same considerations not once but twice when he turned his attention to the
judicial construction of the two applicable statutes. A sensitive construction of
either statute would have rendered unnecessary a judicial decision on the
serious constitutional question of whether the FCC's prohibition of the
broadcast of the Carlin monologue was violative of the first amendment.
The first issue of statutory construction presented in Pacifica was whether
the FCC's action constituted forbidden censorship within the meaning of 47
U.S.C. § 326, which provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the
Commission the power of censorship over the radio corn-
s5 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
s6 Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1941).
17 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,319 (1957). See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87 (1974); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
ss Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
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munications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communication. 9
Going far beyond the facts of the particular case, Justice Stevens held, first,
that section 326 prohibits only the imposition of prior restraints on the con-
tent of broadcast expression by the FCC and that section 326 is wholly
inapplicable when the Commission imposes a subsequent punishment upon
a broadcaster for airing expression which the agency, for any reason, finds
inappropriate. 90 Even apart from the general principle of liberal construction
to avoid constitutional questions, this construction of section 326 is open to
serious dispute.
Justice Stevens relied on two sources of authority in support of this
position. First, he noted that lower courts had limited this provision to a
proscription of prior restraints on two occasions during the period between
1927, when section 326 was originally enacted, and 1934, when it was re-
enacted by Congress.91 This is true, but of dubious significance. The first case
relied on by Justice Stevens was KFKB Broadcasting Association v. Federal
Radio Commission, 2 the rationale of which was "clearly rejected by the
Supreme Court's opinion" 9a in Near v. Minnesota.94 The second case cited by
Justice Stevens was Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Commis-
sion,9 5 where the lower court erroneously relied upon KFKB Broadcasting and
affirmed the denial of license renewal to a radio station whose religious
programming was officially deemed offensive to other people's "religious
sensibilities. '"9 Thus, it is not surprising that knowledgeable commentators,
referring to Stevens' interpretation of section 326, have concluded that "today
it is familiar learning that this is a totally mistaken view."
97
The Pacifica majority's second argument in support of the proposition that
section 326 prohibits only prior restraints by the FCC was that this represents
the consistent interpretation of the Commission and the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals. 98 The difficulty with this argument is three-fold. First, it is
simply erroneous insofar as it ignores the many cases in which section 326 has
been deemed applicable to subsequent restraints on the content of broadcast
expression by the FCC99 and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.100
89 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
9o 438 U.S. at 735-36.
91 ld.
92 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
91 Robinson, supra note 70, at 105.
94 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9- 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
11 Id. at 853.
97 Kalven, supra note 1, at 26. See also Robinson, supra note 70, at 105.
91 438 U.S. at 737.
99 See, e.g., The Polite Society, Inc., 55 F.C.C.2d 810 (1975); WUHY-FM, Eastern Educ.
Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 409-10 (1970); Oliver R. Grace, 22 F.C.C.2d 667-8 (1970).
1oo See, e.g., Banzbaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Anti-Defamation League of
B'Nai B'Rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
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Second, the Court, by relying on authority which held, at most, only that a
particular subsequent restraint was not violative of section 326,101 endorses the
non sequitur that because some subsequent restraints do not violate section
326, none do. Third, Justice Stevens ignored the construction which the
United States Supreme Court had previously given to a similar provision of
the Communications Act of 1934:
The term censorship, however, as commonly understood, connotes
any examination of thought or expression in order to prevent
publication of "objectionable" material. We find no clear expression
of legislative intent, nor any other convincing reason to indicate
Congress meant to give "censorship" a narrower meaning in §
315. . . .Thus, expressly applying this country's tradition of free
expression to the field of radio broadcasting, Congress has from the
first emphatically forbidden the Commission to exercise any power
of censorship over radio communication.
10 2
When Chief Justice Burger sat on the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, he found this mode of statutory interpretation fully applicable to a
construction of section 326.103 In Pacifica, however, the majority ignored
Burger's holding in Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith v. FCC and
instead cited dicta found in a footnote in a concurring opinion written by
Judge Wright to the effect that a license renewal based on vulgar
programming would not violate section 326.104 This footnote cannot
reasonably be thought to support the broad proposition for which it is cited -
that section 326 is wholly inapplicable to all subsequent restraints by the FCC
- since Judge Wright expressly concurred in Burger's broad interpretation of
section 326 and was merely suggesting the existence of a narrow exception to
the general principle endorsed in the majority opinion.1
05
As an alternative ground for holding that section 326 did not bar the FCC
proscription of the broadcast of the Carlin monologue, the Pacifica majority
held that section 326 must "be read as inapplicable to the prohibition on
broadcasting obscene, indecent, or profane language" found in 18 U.S.C. §
1464.106 Although Judge Wright's footnote dicta might have been invoked, the
Pacifica majority cited no precedent in support of this construction of section
326. Instead, Justice Stevens reasoned simply that sections 326 and 1464 were
originally contained in the same section of the Communications Act of 1934,
that "Congress intended to give meaning to both provisions," and that the
removal of section 1464 from the Communications Act to the Criminal Code
"cannot reasonably be interpreted as having been intended to change the
101 See 438 U.S. at 737 n.ll.
10 Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525,527,529-30 (1959) (emphasis
in original) (footnote omitted).
103 Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 930 (1969).
104 438 U.S. at 737, quoting Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d at 173
n.3.
05 403 F.2d at 172.
106 438 U.S. at 738.
[Vol. 27:465
HeinOnline  -- 27 Clev. St. L. Rev.  478 1978
TWO TRADITIONS OF FREE SPEECH
meaning of the anticensorship provision."'1 7 Of course, one could reasonably
differ with Justice Stevens. Indeed, inasmuch as the anticensorship "provision
was discussed only in generalities when it was first enacted" and the legislative
history can only be said not to contradict Stevens' conclusion, 108 it is
unfortunate that the Court chose to ignore the noble principle of statutory
construction announced by the Court in WDAY that, in light of our national
tradition of freedom of expression, only a "clear expression of legislative
intent . . [or] other convincing reason" will justify such a narrow
interpretation of a congressional anticensorship statute. 19 This is especially
true where a liberal interpretation of section 326 would have avoided the
necessity for judicial resolution of an extremely difficult constitutional
question.
The second issue of statutory construction presented in Pacifica was
whether the FCC proscription of the broadcast of the Carlin monologue was
authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1464, which prohibits the utterance of any
"obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communica-
tion.""' Again the Supreme Court majority in Pacifica failed to make use of an
opportunity to construe this statutory provision in such a manner as to avoid
the necessity of deciding a serious constitutional question. In brief, the
Pacifica majority refused to hold that the concept of "indecent" speech was
subsumed within the legal concept of obscenity and instead found that the
statute should be read disjunctively to prohibit three separate and distinct
categories of expression: the "obscene," the "indecent," and the "profane.""'
In order to appreciate the significance of this holding it is necessary to
understand the expansion of the category of unprotected speech which the
Supreme Court sanctioned in Pacifica. The Supreme Court has held, by slim
majorities, that obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. Its current
definition of unprotected obscentiy was set forth in Miller v. California:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary communi-
ty standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state [or federal] law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value."
2
The Federal Communication Commission's definition of indecency
within the meaning of section 1464, at least "at times of the day when there is a
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience,"'1 3 deleted all of the
Miller requirements for obscenity except one, which was altered. Unlike
obscenity, indecency need not appeal to the prurient interest, need not be
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. at 527 (1959).
1,0 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
"1 438 U.S. at 739-40.
112 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
"' Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI-FM, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
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taken as a whole, and may have, in context, serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value. According to the FCC, indecency is merely "language that
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory
activities and organs. ... 114 This definition is broad enough, in the view of
the FCC, to encompass not only words with more than one accepted usage, so
long as one meaning is descriptive of sexual or excretory functions, but also
discussions of sexual topics even if no offensive words are used.' 1 5 While the
Court sought to limit its holding in Pacifica to an affirmance of the specific
Order issued by the FCC, Justice Stevens went beyond endorsing the FCC
definition of indecent and offered an even broader construction:" 'indecent'
merely refers to non conformance with accepted standards of morality."'' 6
In order to reach its conclusion that the statutory term indecent should be
given independent legal significance, the Pacifica majority was forced to
distinguish a large body of persuasive authority to the contrary. Previously the
Court had "construed the term indecent in related statutes to mean obscene,
as that term was defined in Miller v. California." 7 Thus, in 1973 the Supreme
Court stated:
[W]e do have a duty to authoritatively construe federal statutes
where "a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised" and "a con-
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided."... If and when such a "serious doubt" is raised
as to the vagueness of the words "obscene," "lewd," "lascivious,"
"filthy," "indecent," or "immoral" as used to describe regulated
material in 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1462, . . .we are
prepared to construe such terms as limiting regulated material to
patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specific
"hard core" sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. Califor-
nia . ... 118
The four dissenters in Pacifica found this analysis fully applicable to
section 1464, a companion statute to section 1461: "Nothing requires the
conclusion that the word indecent has any meaning in § 1464 other than that
ascribed to the same word in § 1461."19 The majority opinion attempted to
rebut this construction by relying on the fact that "the Commission has long
14 Id.
"5 See id. (the Carlin monologue was found to be indecent even though the seven words
were usually used in contexts unrelated to sexual or excretory functions or activities); WUHY-
FM, Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970) ("shit" and "fuck" are indecent when used in a
non-sexual context for emphasis); Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., WGLD-FM, 27 Rad. Reg. (P-
F)2d 285 (1973) (discussion of oral sex indecent despite total absence of offensive words).
1 438 U.S. at 740. Justice Powell, concurring, used as a standard whether "the language
employed is, to most people, vulgar and offensive." Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring).
117 Id. at 740.
118 United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973)
(citations omitted). See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (construing 18 U.S.C. §
1465); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1461); United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1462); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S.
478, 483 (1962) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1461).
"9 438 U.S. at 779 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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interpreted § 1464 as encompassing more than the obscene.' ' 2 0 There are
several difficulties with this reasoning. First, it ignores the fact that in so
construing section 1464 the FCC initially recognized the dubious con-
stitutionality of its construction by taking the position that "the matter is one of
first impression, and can only be definitively settled by the courts" and inviting
judicial review of the agency's construction.'12 Second, the majority's analysis
ignores the fact that the FCC's position that similar language in 47 U.S.C. §
223, proscribing "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent" telephone
calls, is applicable only to obscene calls. 2 2 Third, the Pacifica majority was
simply disingenious in its reliance on the construction tentatively given section
1464 by the FCC while, at the same time, ignoring the fact that the only
federal court to reach the issue had construed the term indecent to be
synonymous with the term obscene.123 Finally, while the legislative history of
section 1464 is silent on this issue, Justice Stewart's argument in dissent that the
codification of sections 1461, 1462, 1464, and 1465 together in a single chapter
entitled "Obscenity" is the best available evidence of legislative intent seems
persuasive. 124 The best response the majority opinion could muster was the
bare conclusory assertion that, since section 1461 applies to the mails and
section 1464 to the media, "lilt is unrealistic to assume that Congress intended
to impose precisely the same limitations on the dissemination of patently
offensive matter by such different means."' 25 At bottom the majority's
construction of section 1464 rests on nothing more substantial than its
assumption of what would constitute a realistic imputation of legislative
intent.
In light of the tenuous foundation for the Pacifica majority's reading of the
technical meaning of section 1464, it would seem that the invocation of the
principle that statutes should be construed in such a manner as to avoid serious
question of their constitutionality would have been particularly appropriate.
In the majority's view, however, this principle was simply inapplicable
because "it is well settled that the First Amendment has a special meaning in
the broadcasting context."'126 Again the majority's rationale hardly seems
adequate. The Court's own precedent has never satisfactorily explained why
broadcasting should be subject to a special, less strict, first amendment
standard. 27 In any event, in each case where a differential standard has been
applied to the broadcast medium, it has been done in order to expand the first
amendment rights of listeners to access to a diversity of material.12s Indeed,
the Supreme Court itself has recognized, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, that the sort of Commission action at issue in Pacifica could not be
120 Id. at 741 (footnote omitted).
121 WUHY-FM, Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 412-15 (1970).
122 See 438 U.S. at 780 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
123 See United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1977).
124 438 U.S. at 780.
125 Id. at 741.
'2 Id. at 74142 n.17.
'27 See notes 8 & 9 supra.
121 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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justified by reliance on the reasoning used to uphold the FCC's fairness
doctrine:
There is no question here of the Commission's refusal to permit the
broadcaster to carry a particular program or to publish his own
views; . . .of government censorship of a particular program
contrary to § 326; or of the official government view dominating
public broadcasting. Such questions would raise more serious First
Amendment issues.'
29
There is even a more fundamental difficulty with the Court's rationale in
Pacifica. Even assuming that broadcast expression is subject to a special first
amendment standard, the content of that standard remains a difficult
constitutional issue which might have been, but was not avoided by the
means of sensitive statutory construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
The potential consequences of the Supreme Court's substantive construc-
tion of section 1464 are immense. Justice Stevens' majority opinion casts
doubt on several previous Supreme Court decisions, thereby raising the
possibility that many constitutional issues heretofore thought to be firmly
settled will now be subject to relitigation. The constitutionality of the sub-
stantive definition of indecency as nonconformance with accepted stan-
dards of morality offered by Justice Stevens is dubious. In past cases the
Court has held that the standard of "immorality" is both substantively
violative of the first amendment 3 0 and void for vagueness.' 3 1 Once it is
recognized that the standard embraced by the Pacifica majority appears
broad enough to encompass discussions of depictions of violence,13 2 racial or
ethnic epithets, 33 and much religious programming,1 3 4 the significance of the
Court's departure from precedent is apparent. Indeed, it is not even clear that
ordinary cereal advertisements could not be found censorable under the
Court's definition of indecency as mere nonconformance with accepted
standards of morality.
3 5
Justice Stevens has stated in another case that "the line between
communications which 'offend' and those which do not is too blurred to
identify criminal conduct. It is also too blurred to delimit the protections of
129 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969).
130 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
131 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
132 But see Note, The Regulation of Televised Violence, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1291 (1974); Note,
Violence on Television, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROnB. 303 (1970).
133 Cf. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 357 (1973), citing FCC News Report No.
10844 (1972) (refusal to ban the word "nigger" as patently offensive).
"34 Cf. Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962) (patently offensive standard not
applicable to religious or controversial issue broadcasting). But see Trinity Methodist Church,
South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599
(1933) (affirming denial of license renewal largely on grounds of offensive religious program-
rning).
135 See, e.g., Thain, Suffer the Hucksters to Come Unto the Little Children? Possible
Restrictions of Television Advertising to Children Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 56 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1976); Wolinsky & Econome, Seduction in Wonderland:
The Need for a Seller's Fiduciary Duty Toward Children, 4 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 249 (1977); Note,
Unsafe for Little Ears? The Regulation of Broadcast Advertising to Children, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1131 (1978).
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the First Amendment." 136 While he may believe in differential standards of
constitutionality for civil and criminal statutes, 37 the prior Supreme Court
cases rejecting the "immorality" standard have done so in the civil statute
context. 318 In any event, the statute at issue in Pacifica was a criminal statute. It
hardly seems an adequate response to this fact to state, "we need not consider
any question relating to the possible application of § 1464 as a criminal statute"
because in Pacifica civil penalties were threatened by the FCC.13 9 Is the
implication here that section 1464, as construed in Pacifica, is to be held
unconstitutional if applied as a criminal, rather than civil, statute? Such an
interpretation hardly seems to constitute the avoidance of constitutional
decisionmaking. On the other hand, if Justice Stevens meant to imply that
section 1464 will be given one construction as a civil statute and a second as a
criminal statute, other difficulties arise. This hardly seems a realistic
interpretation of legislative intent. Neither is it calculated to avoid the
decision of constitutional questions. Instead, it casts doubt on the vitality of
the Court's unanimous holding in FCC v. American Broadcasting Co.: "It is
true, as contended by the Commission, that these are not criminal cases, but it
is a criminal statute that we must interpret. There cannot be one construction
for the Federal Communications Commission and another for the Depart-
ment of Justice."'
140
The Supreme Court's holding that "obscene, indecent and profane"
language in section 1464 should be construed as prohibiting three separate and
distinct classes of expression also threatens to promote litigation as to the
permissibility and scope of FCC authority to proscribe the broadcast of
"profane" speech. There is judicial precedent for the definition of the
statutory term profane found in section 1464. In 1931 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction of a person for "having referred to an
individual as 'damned,' having used the expression 'By God' irreverently, and
having announced his intention to call down the curse of God upon certain
individuals."' 141 The FCC, relying on this dubious precedent, has used the
profanity standard to justify the revocation of a Citizens Band license.
Recognizing that its action was "not wholly consistent with Brustyn v.
Wilson,' 42 the FCC noted merely that it was not the appropriate body to be
concerned with questions of constitutionality. 143 Despite the fact that the
Supreme Court has consistently held that the first amendment protects
profane expression, 14 4 Pacifica casts doubt on these precedents and raises the
possibility that this constitutional issue will again have to be resolved by the
Court.
Finally, the indecency standard endorsed in Pacifica promises a new spate
"I Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 317.
131 See notes 129-30 supra.
139 438 U.S. at 739 n.13.
140 347 U.S. 284, 296 (1954).
'41 Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931).
142 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
143 In re Warren J. Currence, 33 F.C.C. 827, 834-35 n.16 (1962).
141 See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972).
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of litigation concerning the ascertainment and application of the "contem-
porary community standards for the broadcast medium" 145 by which the
question of indecency is to be determined. This issue, which has provoked a
great deal of obscenity litigation,1 46 is even more important here because the
Court-approved definition of indecency omits the obscenity safeguards that
the expression appeal to the prurient interest, be judged as a whole, and lack
serious literary, political, artistic or scientific value. 147 Inasmuch as the issue
did not arise in Pacifica because the radio station conceded that the Carlin
broadcast was patently offensive, 148 the question of whether the FCC should
apply local or national contemporary community standards remains to be
authoritatively decided. Given the Court's concern for the protection of
children and the FCC's ostensible limitation of its proscription to those times
of the day when children might be in the broadcast audience, 149 it seems clear
that children may be included in the definition of the relevant community.
This does not settle the question, however, of which children might be so
included. Inasmuch as the Court evidenced a particular concern for the
protection of children too young to read, 50 the question arises whether the
FCC can include pre-schoolers specifically in its definition of the relevant
community.
The application of the contemporary community standards concept
presents even more constitutional issues for resolution. Thus, once the
relevant community standards are determined, the FCC must still determine
whether the challenged broadcast material violates those standards. Unless
the commissioners are to apply their own personal predilections, the
application of the community standards formula to a particular broadcast
promises to be a difficult, if not necessarily impossible, litigation-producing
task. 15' Even assuming this problem can be satisfactorily resolved, little is
accomplished if the FCC's goal is to impose a civil penalty. The licensee can
simply refuse to pay the penalty and thereby require the U.S. attorney to
initiate a de novo forfeiture action where the determination of indecency can
be relitigated in a forum where a different contemporary community
standard would probably be applied.1
5 2
All of the difficulties attendant to the ascertainment and application of the
contemporary community standards concept derive from the artificiality of
the concept as utilized by the FCC and endorsed by the Supreme Court.
Simply stated, the FCC has never attempted to determine the actual
community acceptability of the broadcasts it wishes to proscribe. Instead it
14- 438 U.S. at 731-32, quoting Pacifica Foundation, Station WBAI-FM, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98.
146 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87
(1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
117 See text at notes 112-14 supra.
141 438 U.S. at 739.
149 Id. at 733, 749-50.
150 Id. at 749.
'51 See Waples and White, Choice of Community Standard in Federal Obscenity Proceedings:
The Role of the Constitution and the Common Law, 64 VA. L. REV. 399, 417-18 (1978); Note,
Filthy Words, the FCC and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscentiy, 61 VA. L.
REV. 579 (1975).
"I See Waples and White, supra note 151, at 418.
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has undertaken to enforce a standard of acceptability which the com-
missioners of that agency believe appropriate. Thus, in Pacifica, for example,
the only indication of community disapproval of the broadcast of the Carlin
monologue was a single listener complaint. 153 It would seem, on first
impression, that the fact that only one listener in the entire city of New York
found the broadcast sufficiently offensive to justify the minimal effort and
expense of filing a letter of complaint would constitute the best evidence that
the vast majority of the radio station's listening audience, the contemporary
community for this broadcast medium, did not find the Carlin monologue
patently offensive (or at least found the monologue enjoyable despite or
because of its alleged offensiveness). As noted by the District of Columbia
Circuit, this reasoning has particular strength when applied to the electronic
media:
The Commission assumes that absent FCC action, filth will flood
the airwaves. Thus the Commission argues that the alternative of
turning the dial will not aid the sensitive person in his efforts to avoid
filthy language. The Order provides no empirical data to substan-
tiate this assumption. Moreover, the assumption ignores the forces of
economics and of ratings on the substance of programming.
Licensees are businesses and depend on advertising revenues for
survival. The corporate profit motive and the connection between
advertising revenue and audience size suggest that the dike will hold
as long as the community remains actually offended by what it sees
or hears. Commentators and commissioners alike have noted that
broadcast media require majorities, or at least sizeable pluralities, to
pay the bills. If they are correct, and if the Commission truly seeks
only to enforce community standards, the market should limit the
filth accordingly.
54
The Supreme Court responded to this argument by noting the "prosperity
of those who traffic in pornographic literature and films" 1 5 5 and suggesting
that it was unlikely that "[s]mut [would] drive itself from the market .... 156
In one sense the Supreme Court's observation is virtually irrefutable. Despite
the differences in market structure between the motion picture and publishing
industries and the broadcast industry, every parent is aware of the sorry lack
of wholesome movies in today's society, and there is no guarantee that the
invisible hand of the marketplace would not affect television programming in
a similar fashion. As true as this may be, however, it is hardly an adequate
response to the argument that the FCC is not realistically seeking to enforce
actual community standards but instead its own conception of proper
programming choice. If the smut successfully drives Sesame Street off the air,
" 438 U.S. at 730. See also Sonderling Broadcasting Co., 41 F.C.C.2d 919 (1975) (top-rated
radio program); WUHY-FM, Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 409 n.2 (1970) (no listener
complaints made to station); Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833,835 (1970) (one
complaint).
' Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original)
(footnotes omitted), paraphrasing Note, supra note 151, at 615.
115 438 U.S. at 744 n.19.
151 Id. (quoting Bazelon, C.J., in Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d at 35).
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it will be only because the majority of television viewers prefer to watch smut.
There may be good policy reasons for allowing the government to interfere
with the viewing preferences of the broadcast audience and the economically
motivated programming choices of the broadcasters in order to prevent this
from occurring. But the argument that the FCC is only enforcing the
contemporary community standards contradicts reality. As long as the
ostensible standard remains that of a hypothetical and unrealistic contem-
porary community, great difficulties will continue to be presented
necessitating artificial rationales for judicial decisionmaking. And, most
deplorably, this artificial and unrealistic decisionmaking, as a result of the
Court's opinion in Pacifica, will occur on the level of constitutional
interpretation.
In Pacifica, the Supreme Court violated the long-standing and salutary
principle that statutes should be construed in such a manner as to avoid the
necessity for the decision of difficult constitutional questions. The Court also
ignored the honorable national tradition of unfettered expressive activity
which the Court has guarded zealously in the context of nonbroadcast
expression. As a result the Court not only endorsed the power of the FCC to
engage in extensive regulation of the content of broadcast expression but also
consciously refused to delineate any statutory limitations whatsoever on the
scope of that power. Instead, the Court largely nullified section 326 as an
effective limit on FCC power and construed section 1464 to give the FCC
censorial powers which even the agency previously had doubted it possessed.
The Court's statutory construction in Pacifica also casts doubt on
numerous precedents of the Court and threatens to undermine whatever
stability was present in an inherently unstable area of the law. Its failure to
adequately explain why or whether its mode of statutory construction was
dependent upon the fact that the case involved broadcast expression
threatens future consequences for constitutional doctrine outside of the
context in which the case arose. Finally, the expansive construction of the
statutes at issue in Pacifica necessitated a decision on the substantive
constitutionality of the FCC's action in prohibiting the broadcast of the Carlin
monologue.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BROADCAST OF OFFENSIVE WORDS
The Supreme Court's strained construction of the relevant statutes which
necessitated, rather than avoided, a decision of constitutional magnitude
might be understandable if the Court had its doctrinal apparatus well in hand
and desired to seize a unique opportunity to make a clear statement of
governing constitutional principle. Unfortunately, the Court in Pacifica
demonstrated an astounding confusion as to basic first amendment principles
and a studied indifference to free speech values and precedent. While it is
tempting to conclude that the only agreement which could be mustered by a
majority of the Court was simply that the power of the FCC to proscribe the
broadcast of the Carlin monologue should be upheld, there were three issues
upon which there was general consensus.
The first point of agreement is very real and has major doctrinal
importance for first amendment jurisprudence. The principle is aptly stated
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by Justice Stevens: "it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the
government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.'' 5 7 This passage
must not be dismissed as a mere off-hand comment. Rather, it reflects the
essential meaning of the first amendment command that the government not
abridge freedom of speech: "its regulation of communication may not be
affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being expressed by the
communicator."' 158 It extends beyond the rejection of seditious libel as an
offense and prohibits every governmental attempt to censor communicative
activity on the grounds that it is officially deemed to express false doctrine: "if
it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection.' ' 59 And this is true in the Pacifica
context regardless of whether "the Commission's characterization of the
Carlin monologue as offensive could be traced to its political content - or
even to the fact that it satirized contemporary attitudes about four letter
words."
160
The second point of agreement among the members of the Court is
equally real and important. There was a general consensus that the gov-
ernmental regulation at issue in Pacifica was based on the content of the
Carlin monologue and hence subject to more rigorous judicial scrutiny than
the ad hoc balancing by which the Court determines the constitutionality of
regulations which are keyed solely to the time, place, or manner of the
expression.16 ' Thus, all members of the Supreme Court recognize that
intensive scrutiny is appropriate not just for governmental regulations which
explicitly discriminate on the basis of the speaker's ideological message but
for all governmental regulations based on the meaning of the words or
symbols conveyed by the speaker.
The third point on which all the Justices agreed in Pacifica was that
offensive language which is not obscene is not excluded from first amendment
protection.16 2 Despite the fact that many Supreme Court cases have so held,1 3
the unanimous agreement on this point may be deceptive. In past cases Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist have vociferously
argued that offensive language is entitled to no first amendment protection." 4
Hopefully, these three Justices, by silently joining opinions inconsistent with
that view, have abandoned their untenable minority position.
The potential significance of these three points of consensus within the
Id. at 745-46 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
158 Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,67 (1976) (footnote omitted). Seealso
Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
159 438 U.S. at 745.
160 Id. at 746.
161 Id. at 746-47. The concurring opinion of Justice Powell, id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring),
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, id. at 768 n.3 & 773 (Brennan, J. dissenting), both
proceed from an implicit acceptance of this characterization of the FCC Order.
12 See id. at 747; id. at 756-57 (Powell, J. concurring); id. at 763 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163 See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408
U.S. 901 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
164 See, e.g., Eaton v. Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697,701 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Rosenfeld v.
New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901,902 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
534 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Court should not be underestimated; nevertheless, the disarray within the
Court as to the doctrinal significance and proper application of these general
principles is alarming.
The opinion of Justice Stevens, while recognizing that the FCC Order was
based on the content of the Carlin monologue, proceeded immediately to
defeat the value of.this insight by reasoning that the first amendment does not
prohibit all governmental regulations based on the content of the expres-
sion 6 5 and that, therefore, it was appropriate for the Supreme Court to grant
less first amendment protection to some expressions because their content is
judicially deemed to have little social value.6 6 Justice Stevens was explicit
that it was only because of the slight social value of the expression that the
governmental interests of protecting children and unwilling adults from the
broadcast of offensive words were sufficient to uphold the FCC Order. 67 The
difficulties with this reasoning go to the very heart of first amendment
doctrine.
First, Justice Stevens' conclusion does not follow logically from his
premise and is based on a serious misunderstanding of the precedents upon
which he relies and, indeed, on the history of first amendment jurisprudence.
It is true that an unguarded dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire stated
the proposition that some expression is wholly outside the scope of first
amendment protection because of its lack of social utility. 166 This dictum was,
for a time, applied to other areas of first amendment concern 16 9 and, even
today, maintains an uneasy hold on the law of obscenity.1 70 But the history of
first amendment adjudication has largely recognized the intellectual
inadequacy of this approach. Thus, it is now clear that the government may
prohibit "fighting words," not because they lack social value, but because the
government has an important interest in preventing breaches of the peace.'
7 1
Likewise, the government may make libellous statements actionable because
of its interest in the protection of individual reputations. The Court was
extremely cautious in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. to premise its differential
treatment of public and private persons on the greater injury suffered by the
latter, rather than on any supposed difference in the social value of the
165 438 U.S. at 744.
166 Id. at 747-48.
167 Id. at 746 n.22.
1- 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
169 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) (libel); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (commercial speech).
170 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). The weakness of the hold which the social value theory maintains on the law of obscenity
is indicated by both the narrow 5-4 majority in these cases and the majority's felt necessity for
identifying the governmental interests held sufficient to justify the suppression of obscene
material. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 57-70.
The Court also continues to rely on the social value theory in evaluating governmental
regulations of commercial speech. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978);
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In both cases the Court included a detailed analysis of the
countervailing governmental interests and Justice Marshall's separate opinion demonstrated that
the Courts reliance on a judicial assessment of the social utility of the expression was unnecessary.
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 468.
171 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971);
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). Indeed, this was the holding of Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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libellous expression. 172 Similarly, in the area of subversive advocacy, the
rationale for the judicial affirmance of regulations proscribing speech which
threatens the violent overthrow of the government was clearly stated by
Justice Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent."'
73
Thus, the fact that the Court has upheld governmental regulations of the
content of expression because of the harm which such expression causes does
not justify Stevens' conclusion that it is appropriate for the Court to uphold
such content regulations, depending on the context and circumstances in
which the speech occurs, on the basis of a judicially supposed lack of social
value. Justice Stevens' liberalized reading of the Chaplinsky dictum to justify
only partial, rather than total, suppression of such expression 174 does not
overcome the serious departure from first amendment values, principles,
precedent, and tradition upon which his mode of reasoning is based.
The second difficulty with Justice Stevens' Pacifica rationale is that it
contradicts the very grounds which have led the Court to accept the need for
intensive judicial scrutiny of governmental regulations based on the content
of the challenged expression. He did not argue that the message con-
tained in the Carlin monologue lacked social value. Clearly the monologue
expressed the idea "that the words it uses are 'harmless' and that our atti-
tudes toward them are 'essentially silly.' "175 And Justice Stevens explicitly
recognized that judicial agreement or disagreement with this message was
not a proper ground for decision.1 7 6 Thus, the reliance on the premise
that the expression lacked social value requires the Court to ignore the
value of the speaker's message and base its decision on a judicial assess-
ment of the utility of the particular words chosen by the speaker.
177 It
assumes that the ideological message can be divorced from the words chosen
to express it: "A requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its
primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication.
There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less
offensive language.'
17
If it is assumed that expression can be neatly divided into two separate
elements - the ideological message and the form of that message - and if the
Court is going to premise its decision on the supposed social value of the
expression, it must make an essentially unprincipled choice between the
message and the form as the referent upon which to base its finding of social
utility. There is no principled reason why the Court should not characterize
Carlin's message as valuable social commentary rather than inutile offensive
172 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
17" Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The modem test in the area of subversive
advocacy is stated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), but the underlying
governmental interest remains the same.
174 438 U.S. at 746.
175 Id. at 746 n.22.
176 See text at notes 157-60 supra.
177 438 U.S. at 746-47.
171 Id. at 743 n.18.
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language. The more fundamental objection to Stevens' rationale is that in fact
it is not possible to neatly divorce the message from the form of expression;
indeed, this is precisely the basis for the intensive scrutiny which the Court has
traditionally given content-based regulations of expression. Such regulations,
it has been recognized, are directed at complex, indivisible "mixed
utterances" which contain both good and bad elements which are inextricably
intertwined. 179 Justice Harlan, recognizing this reality, stated, "we cannot
indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without
also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."180 Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Pacifica, explained cogently the basis for the Court's
traditional acceptance of this fundamental premise:
The idea that the content of a message and its potential impact on
any who might receive it can be divorced from the words that are the
vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious. A given word
may have a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or
conjure up an image. 18'
The wisdom of not attempting an artificial separation of message and form
is demonstrated not only by the fact that a large proportion of our great
literature, including the Bible, contains words deemed void of social value by
Justice Stevens but also by the Pacifica case itself. The Carlin monologue was
both a trenchant satire of society's taboo on the use of certain words and a
criticism of the FCC policy which forbade the broadcast of those words. It
thus fell squarely within the category of expression which is known as
seditious libel and ordinarily is entitled to the greatest first amendment
protection. If Justice Stevens is correct, it does not detract in the least from
Carlin's monologue to limit it to the simple statement, "the government has a
silly law prohibiting the use of certain words, but I can't tell you what they
are." The absurdity of Stevens' position, that the impact of criticism of
government policy is not lessened by the inability to identify the policy, is
obvious.
The separation of message and form is artificial in another sense. The
vague and limitless nature of the government's objection to the offensiveness
of certain words is such that the government can easily mask its objection to
the ideological message as an objection to the form in which that message is
expressed. Justice Stevens has, on another occasion, recognized the infirmity
of vagueness and limitlessness found in the government's asserted interest in
policing the adherence to conventions of etiquette in the form of expression. It
is "often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Indeed, we think it is
largely because government officials [or jurors] cannot make principled
distinctions in this area that the constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual.' 8 2 It is this very characteristic which engenders the
danger that "governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular
"I Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 12.
180 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
181 438 U.S. at 778.
"I Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,316 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. at 25.
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words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular
views."' 1 It is not surprising that commentators who advocate government
suppression of offensive words base their position on opposition to the
ideological message the expression communicates more than formal
considerations of etiquette.18 4 There is even some force to the allegation made
by Justice Brennan in his Pacifica dissent: "[T]he Court's decision may be seen
for what, in the broader perspective, it really is: another of the dominant
culture's inevitable efforts to force those groups who do not share its mores to
conform to its way of thinking, acting, and speaking."'18 5
In any event, subsequent events have clearly demonstrated that the FCC's
objection to the Carlin monologue was based on its ideological message rather
than its use of offensive words. Since the Court's decision in Pacifica, many
television stations across the country have aired a documentary entitled
"Scared Straight" which is intended to show teenagers the horrors juvenile
offenders face in jail. Characters in this documentary use the very words
proscribed by the FCC in Pacifica, and use them repeatedly for their shock
value in a context more likely to appeal to the prurient interest than was
Carlin's monologue. Additionally, "Scared Straight" was specifically aimed at
teenagers, an age group which the Pacifica Court deemed in need of
protection from such language. Clearly the only distinction between the
documentary and the Carlin monologue is the acceptability of the ideological
message; yet the FCC has specifically approved the broadcast of the
documentary. 8 6 In the future we can be certain that the Commission, acting
as ideological censors, will grant similar exemptions to broadcast messages it
finds acceptable.
The final flaw in Justice Stevens' rationale was his unfounded assumption
that words which offend some people have no social value. In context, the
reality is precisely the opposite. First, offensive words have an affirmative
social value because they are inextricably intertwined with the expression of
ideological messages. Thus, recognizing that as a democracy, we have a
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"'187 Justice Harlan eloquently
described the social value of words found offensive by some people:
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom [of
expression] may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and
even offensive utterance. These are, however, within established
limits, in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values
which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. That the air
may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a
sign of weakness but of strength. 88
183 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 26.
184 See A. Cox, THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 45-48 (1976);
Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 Sup.
CT. REV. 281, 282.
1" 438 U.S. at 779.
116 See NEWSWEEK, April 23, 1979, at 101.
187 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
188 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 24-25. See also Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,
673-74 (1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
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Offensive words also have social value because of their unique capacity to
express the strength of conviction or other emotion underlying the idea
communicated. The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that words
have an emotive value which no synonym can adequately capture:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function:
it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact,
words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive
force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while
solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking,
may often be the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated. 1 9
It simply cannot realistically be thought that when an individual says on
the radio, "Political change is so fucking slow,"190 that the statement "Political
change is very slow" conveys the same depth of sincerity, anger, and
frustration. Similarly if the law demands that the phrase "Repeal the Draft" be
substituted for "Fuck the Draft," "[c]learly something is lost in the
translation."'' Indeed, it is precisely because of the strength of the anger and
frustration, because the individual is so seriously at odds with society, that the
message is important to hear.
92
Finally, offensive words have an affirmative value because they "may be
the stuff of everyday conversations in some, if not many, of the innumerable
subcultures that compose this Nation."' 93 Indeed, the Office of the President
of the United States during the tenure of Richard Nixon was one of these
"subcultures" where the use of words found offensive by many was a frequent
occurrence. The proscription of the broadcast of such words thus threatens to
inhibit the broadcasting of both the views of members of these subcultures
and information about the activities and concerns of these individuals.1
94
In light of the serious difficulties with the plurality's rationale for upholding
the FCC Order, it is not surprising that the concurring opinion of Justices
Powell and Blackmun specifically rejected Stevens' "theory that the
Justices . . . are free generally to decide on the basis of its content which
speech protected by the First Amendment is most 'valuable' and hence
deserving of the most protection, and which is less 'valuable' and hence
deserving of less protection.' '9 5 Instead, the concurrence reasoned that the
FCC Order was not violative of the first amendment because it was justified
189 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 26.
190 WUHY-FM, Eastern Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 409 (1970).
191 Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To? 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 153,
189 (1972).
192 Kalven, supra note 179, at 11.
193 438 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 776 n.8. See also Note, "Offensive Speech" and the First Amendment, 53 B.U. L. REv.
834 (1973).
195 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring).
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by the government's substantial interest in protecting children and unwilling
adults from involuntary exposure to the Carlin monologue. 196
Two factors are important here. First, while Justice Stevens also relied on
the presence of these two government interests, he was explicit in agreeing
with the dissenters that these interests would not justify the FCC Order unless
the degree of first amendment protection to the Carlin monologue was first
denigrated by a finding that it lacked social value.1 97 The second point is that
the plurality and concurrence agreed that the special nature of the broadcast
medium was a significant factor in sustaining the FCC Order. 98 Unfortunate-
ly, in relying on this rationale both opinions bootstrap a conclusion on the basis
of circular reasoning. The reason why broadcasting is a unique medium, we
are told, is because it intrudes on the governmental interest in protecting
children and unwilling adult listeners. 99 But the only significance of the
uniqueness of the medium in Pacifica was to justify a more lenient scrutiny of
the very governmental interests which form the basis for finding the medium
unique. Every medium is unique in the sense of being different in some
respects from other media. The essential question, however, is whether the
difference justifies governmental regulations which would be unconstitutional
if applied to other media. Prior to Pacifica the Court had clearly held that "the
basic principles of freedom of speech and the press . . . do not vary
according to the medium upon which the speaker expresses a message," while
at the same time recognizing that "capacity for evil . . . may be relevant in
determining the permissible scope of community control. '" 20 0 It is unfortunate
that the plurality and concurring opinions in Pacifica disregarded established
precedent and invoked instead the rationale that broadcasting is a special
medium, thereby avoiding a sensitive inquiry into the underlying governmen-
tal interests asserted in support of a substantial restriction of the freedom of
expression guaranteed by the first amendment.
Both the plurality and concurring opinions found that, in the broadcasting
context, the interest in protecting children from exposure to words deemed
indecent by the FCC was adequate to justify the proscription of the airing of
the Carlin monologue at two o'clock in the afternoon on a school day.
20 '
Although the Court explicitly left open the question of whether such
broadcasts would be permissible during the late night hours,20 2 the times
available for such broadcasts, if the Court is serious about the need to protect
children, are rare indeed since statistics demonstrate that youngsters
constitute a significant portion of the broadcast audience until 1:30 a.m.
daily.203 In this light it is difficult to refute the assessment of Chief Judge
Bazelon that " [a]dults with normal sleeping habits will be limited to programs
191 Id. at 756-62 (Powell, J., concurring).
I'l Id. at 745 n. 2 0.
1a9 Id. at 748-49; id. at 761-62 (Powell, J., concurring).
'99 Id. at 748-49; id. at 756-62 (Powell, J., concurring).
200 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952). See also Superior Films v.
Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring).
201 438 U.S. at 750; id. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring).
101 Id. at 750 n.28; id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
203 See Paciflca Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d at 13-14.
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'fit for children.' ",204 Thus, regardless of the strength of the governmental
interest in protecting children, the Pacifica holding would appear to validate a
classic example of "burn[ing] the house to roast the pig."20 5 Justice Stevens
reasoned that the FCC Order did not have this effect because "[a]dults who
feel the need may purchase tapes and records or go to theatres and nightclubs
to hear these words."2061 Unfortunately, this rationale, rather than persuasively
distinguishing Butler v. Michigan, 207 casts doubt on another fundamental
principle of first amendment jurisprudence: "one is not to have the exercise of
his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may
be exercised in some other place."20 8 The Pacifica rationale is particularly
inappropriate as applied since it ignores "the fact that these alternatives
involve the expenditure of money, time, and effort that many of those wishing
to hear Mr. Carlin's message may not be able to afford, and a naive innocence
of the reality that in many cases the medium may well be the message. '"2 0 9 In
addition, the alternatives offered by the Court are a significantly less effective
means for communicating with adults who do not deliberately seek out
Carlin's message.
210
Justice Powell, apparently recognizing the weakness of the alternative
opportunities rationale, offered a second rationale for distinguishing Butler. In
his opinion the limitation of access to expression of adults in order to protect
children was justifiable because "a physical separation of the audience cannot
be accomplished in the broadcast media."2 1' There are two flaws in this
reasoning. First, experience indicates that physical segregation of readers of
printed obscenity is impossible because of the "flourishing 'outside business'
in these materials." 212 Thus, there is little foundation in fact for Powell's
premise that audience separation is ever really possible. The second, and
more fundamental, flaw in Powell's reasoning is his faulty generalization from
obscenity to materials which are merely indecent. The limited class of
material deemed obscene can be easily labelled as suitable for adults, but the
class of material which might be thought indecent is nearly limitless. Physical
labelling may be possible, but it certainly seems inappropriate that the Holy
204 Id. at 27 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
205 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). See also Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S.
293, 297 (1978) ("children are not to be included ... as a part of the 'community' as that term
relates to 'obscene materials' . . .").
206 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 750 n.28. See also id. at 760 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
207 The statute at issue in Butler did not ban the sale or distribution of all material deemed
unsuitable for children, only books. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,381 (1957). Thus, under the
statute, adults had uninhibited access to such material via movies, records, tapes, and even radio
and television.
208 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,757 n.15 (1976); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974) (per curiam); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974).
20 438 U.S. at 774 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210 See Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977). See also text at
notes 253-55 infra.
2" 438 U.S. at 758 (Powell, J., concurring).
212 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,58 n.7 (1973). See also Kaplan v. California, 413
U.S. 115, 120 (1973); United States v. Twelve 200 Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129
(1973).
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Bible be required to be sold in a brown wrapper labelled "indecent" because
it contains words which some consider unseemly for children.
2 13
Even if Pacifica did not have the unfortunate effect of severely curtailing
the first amendment rights of adults in the broadcast audience, its finding that
the governmental interest in protecting children is adequate to justify
depriving them of access to the Carlin monologue is difficult to square with
Supreme Court precedent. The Court has uniformly held that children
possess significant first amendment rights, 2 14 although these rights are
somewhat less than those possessed by adults. 215 Thus, the Court had held that
material, even though constitutionally protected as to adults, could be
proscribed for children if it appealed to their prurient interest, was patently
offensive to them, and had no redeeming social value for them. 216 In
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,2 1 7 the Court made it explicit that this
constituted the outer limit of permissible governmental protection of children
from unseemly material: "Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor
subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks
unsuitable for them. '"2 18 And, in Carey v. Population Services International,
2 9
the Court held that the advertising of contraceptives to children, even though
offensive as to children, could not be proscribed. 2 0 In Pacifica, however,
Justice Stevens, making no effort to distinguish Erznoznik and Carey,
explicitly stated that children have no first amendment right to see, hear, or
read material deemed indecent by some governmental authority: "Bookstores
and motion picture theatres, for example, may be prohibited from making
indecent material available to children.
'" 22 '
It is inconceivable that Pacifica was intended to overrule these two recent
Burger Court decisions sub silentio. In any event, it is difficult to locate any
convincing reason why the government should be empowered to proscribe
children's access to indecent material either entirely or merely on the
electronic media. Contrary to the unsupported assertion of Justice Powell
that the "language involved in this case is as potentially degrading and
harmful to children as representations of many erotic acts,"2 22 there is no
213 See 438 U.S. at 771 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As pointed out by Justice Brennan, many
of the classics, including the works of Auden, Becket, Bums, Byron, Chaucer, Fielding, Greene,
Hemingway, Joyce, Knowles, Lawrence, Orwell, Scott, Shakespeare, and Swift, would have to
be labelled indecent. Even particular issues of newspapers and national news magazines would
be subject to a labelling requirement. See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d at 17.
214 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Sews. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
I'5 See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944).
211 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
217 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
211 Id. at 213-14.
219 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
220 Id. at 701.
221 438 U.S. at 749. Justice Powell expressed a similar viewpoint in his concurring opinion
("society may prevent the general dissemination of such speech to children .... ). Id. at 758
(Powell, J., concurring).
222 Id.
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empirical evidence that the exposure to indecent material causes any harm to
children.223 Logically, the first time a child hears a particular word, it is merely
a sound without meaning and thus incapable of causing harm to the child. A
youngster's vocabulary is only enlarged2 24 when an adult explains the meaning
of the word. At this time the harm, embarrassment to the adult, is not done to
the child and, in any event, seems too trivial for judicial cognizance. 2 5 After
the child has learned the meaning of the word, it is difficult to understand what
injury can be accomplished by a second exposure. The underlying
assumption in Pacifica, that words descriptive of sexual organs or functions
have a deleterious effect on juveniles, is downright silly when contrasted to the
Court's recent holdings that children have a constitutional right to buy and use
contraceptives 226 and to secure an abortion without parental consent.22 7 On
what basis can such constitutional doctrine be supported, which, in effect,
grants children a right to "do it" but not hear about it?
If children have a first amendment right to hear indecent words anywhere
except on the electronic media, then the Pacifica protection-of-children
rationale becomes nothing more than a make-weight argument. Two reasons
have been offered to justify a partial proscription of indecent words on radio
and television, but both are grossly inadequate. First, it was suggested by
Circuit Judge Leventhal that "it makes a difference whether they hear [the
words] in certain places, such as the locker room or gutter, or at certain times,
that do not identify general acceptability." 2 8 The difficulty with this rationale,
which attempts to justify censorship on the premise of ideological opposition
to the implicit message that these words are proper and acceptable in our
society, rather than on the grounds that it furthers a government interest in
protecting children, is that it is simply contrary to the "central tenet of the First
Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas.."229 The holding of the Court in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v.
Regents is fully applicable to this rationale:
What New York has done, therefore, is to prevent the exhibition
of a motion picture because that picture advocates an idea - that
adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior. Yet
the First Amendment's basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate
ideas. The state, quite simply, has thus struck at the very heart of
constitutionally protected liberty.
230
The second reason offered to justify the proscription of indecent words on
the airwaves is that the state may enforce the desire of many parents that their
223 Note, supra note 151, at 620-21. Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 641-42 (skeptically
noting that "studies" on this point have reached conflicting results).
224 See 438 U.S. at 749.
225 The same harm to children is caused by learning the meaning of the word "fuck," for
example, as that inflicted by learning the meaning of the term "sexual intercourse" since the two
words signify the same underlying concept.
20 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
227 Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
228 Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d at 34 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
229 438 U.S. at 745-46.
230 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
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children not be exposed to these words.231 No one disputes the right of parents
to raise their children as they see fit.2 32 The question presented in Pacifica,
however, was whether the government could deny access to materials
containing indecent words to children whose parents have no objection and to
consenting adults on the assumption that most parents prefer that their
children not be exposed to indecent words on the electronic media. Prior to
Pacifica, the Supreme Court had never allowed the government to exercise
such far-reaching power over the content of expressive activities protected by
the first amendment - not even in the more justifiable case of material
deemed obscene as to children. 233 The reasons why the government should
not be given such power are easily understood. As long as parents do not
uniformly object to the broadcast of indecent words, the governmental action
consists of no more than a value-laden choice between the competing wishes
of two groups of parents. Indeed, what the government is doing in such a
situation is essentially insulating its own rationale for censorship from
effective judicial review by attributing it to one of two groups of parents. The
scope of governmental power to control the content of broadcast expression
thus becomes limitless, since no doubt there are some parents who object to
their children being exposed to any controversial (and much noncontrover-
sial) programming. 234 If the government is to be allowed to assert such a
dangerous rationale in support of a content-based censorship of broadcast
expression, the Court should at least require proof that objecting parents are
less able to prevent their children's access to indecent words on radio and
television than from other sources, such as books, newspapers and playmates,
since it is precisely on such an improbable assumption that the Supreme
Court's decision in Pacifica ultimately rests.
235
The Pacifica reliance on the protection of captive listeners from
involuntary exposure to the broadcast of the Carlin monologue as a rationale
for upholding the FCC Order is no more persuasive, in light of the Court's
own precedent, than its invocation of a governmental interest in the
protection of children. Pacifica held that the simple fact that radio and
television, if voluntarily turned on, have the ability to enter the sanctity of the
home was sufficient to justify the FCC's proscription of a broadcast of
material which some recipients might find off ensive.23a If the Supreme Court
had limited its review to the particular facts of Pacifica, there is little or no
evidence in the record to support the invocation of this governmental interest.
The radio station had prefaced its broadcast of the Carlin monologue with
warnings that it contained sensitive language.2 37 Thus, the only listeners who
might have been offended by the broadcast were those who tuned in after the
231 438 U.S. at 749; id. at 757-58 (Powell, J., dissenting).
232 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
233 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
234 See Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d at 28 (Bazelon, C. J., concurring) ("Parents
might also wish to shield their children from programs advancing controversial political or
religious beliefs or programs discussing difficult contemporary problems such as abortion.").
235 See id.
23' 438 U.S. at 74849; id. at 759 (Powell, J., concurring).
237 Id. at 730.
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warnings and before the monologue concluded a few minutes later and who
were unable to tune out in time to avoid a sensitive word. The record in
Pacifica disclosed that in the entire city of New York, there was one person
who fit this description, and there was no evidence that anyone was offended
while in the refuge of a private residence.238 It can only be assumed that the
overwhelming majority of those who heard the broadcast did so voluntarily
and found the Carlin monologue enjoyable - or at least inoffensive. Thus, the
holding in Pacifica can only be justified on the premise that each individual is
entitled to complete protection from involuntary exposure to offensive words
on the electronic media. 23 9 But Pacifica itself rejects this rationale by
suggesting that the broadcast of offensive words may be permissible in the
late evening when it is equally likely that at least one unsuspecting individual
might accidentally stumble upon an offensive word on the radio or
television.2 40 In the end, the protection of captive listeners rationale in Pacifica
offers no support for the affirmance of the FCC Order.
There is a more fundamental objection to the Court's reliance on an
interest in the protection of captive listeners. Pacifica casts doubt upon a large
body of Supreme Court precedent by giving controlling weight to the single
factor that broadcasting enters the home of the individual. Prior to Pacifica the
Supreme Court always engaged in a sensitive evaluation of four con-
siderations relevant to a proper accommodation of the competing societal
interests in freedom of expression and freedom from expression. These four
factors are: the nature of the affected privacy interest; the substantiality of the
affected privacy interest; the existence and extent of audience captivity; and
the degree to which the rights of willing listeners are infringed by the
particular governmental regulation .241
The first factor is the nature of the asserted interest in individual privacy.
On the one hand, a person may object to any intrusion upon tranquillity. In
this situation the privacy claim is of a right to be free from all communication,
or other disruption, by a particular means, at a particular time, or in a
particular place. Obviously, this was not the privacy interest asserted in
Pacifica. One who turns on a radio or television does so in order to receive
some communication and is willing to accept the accompanying visual and
aural intrusion upon seclusion. The asserted privacy interest in Pacifica was
rather a claim of a right to be free from the content of a particular broadcast
program. Traditionally, the Court has given much less deference to this
second, content-based, privacy interest because its recognition poses a
significant threat of "making the closed mind a principal feature of the open
society. '" 242 The difference in the Court's treatment of these two privacy
23s Id. at 730. The FCC maintains that millions of radio listeners "scan the dial" every day. See
Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 Rad. Reg. (P-H) 2d 285, 288 (1973); WUHY-FM, Eastern
Educ. Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408,411 (1970). This statistic has no application to Pacifica unless it is
corrected to reflect the number of dial twisters in New York City on October 30, 1973, who
happened to encounter one particular radio station, WBAI-FM, during the twelve minutes when
the Carlin monologue was broadcast and were offended by what they may or may not have
heard.
239 But see 438 U.S. at 748-50.
240 Id. at 750 n.28; id. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring).
241 See generally Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233,262-
72.
242 H. KALVEN, supra note 83, at 159.
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interests is vividly illustrated by the soundtruck cases. In the first, Saia v. New
York, 243 the Court invalidated a local ordinance granting the chief of police
the discretionary authority to prohibit the use of soundtrucks in the
community because of the danger that the lack of standards in the ordinance
would permit the chief of police to discriminate on the basis of the content of
particular soundtruck messages. 2441n contrast, Kovacs v. Cooper2 45 upheld a
local ordinance prohibiting all soundtrucks which emit "loud and raucous
noises" because the ordinance was narrowly limited to a content-neutral
concern about time, place, and volume of soundtrucks.
246
The second factor to be considered is the substantiality of the particular
privacy interest. The Court has recognized that the degree of deference to be
given to a claim of protected freedom from unwanted communication should
vary depending on the time and place where that claim is asserted. Thus, for
example, the privacy claim is strongest when asserted in the home.247 To some
extent, as the dissenters in Pacifica argued, the substantiality of the privacy
interest is lessened when the individual asserting the interest has voluntarily
invited the intrusion, as by turning on a radio or television.2 48 On the other
hand, too much can easily be made of this argument that, by turning on a radio
or television, the person has chosen to take part in a public medium. When, as
in Pacifica, the home listener has no knowledge of the content of a particular
program, he has voluntarily entered the public domain only in the sense that
one who unknowingly answers an obscene telephone call or opens an obscene
letter has done so.
The third, and most important, factor which the Supreme Court, prior to
Pacifica, found relevant to a privacy claim is the existence and extent of
audience captivity. If there is no captivity, then the interest in being free of
unwanted expression is not even implicated.2 49 The greatest flaw of Pacifica is
its unprecedented use of inability to avoid initial exposure to an unwanted
communication as the test of audience captivity. Pacifica held that one who is
subjected to an initial, momentary, and unconsented exposure to an offensive
message is a captive listener despite the fact that this individual can easily
avoid continued exposure by changing stations or turning off the receiver.
250
24 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
214 Id. at 562. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). But see
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Although Lehman had the effect of up-
holding a content-based captive audience claim, the deciding vote of Justice Douglas was explic-
itly grounded upon the rationale that there is a constitutional right to be free from all buscards
regardless of content. Id. at 308 (Douglas, J., concurring).
245 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
246 Id. at 81-82. The Court, however, has not upheld all content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulations intended to protect the solitude of unwilling listeners. See, e.g., Public
Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Martin v. City of Struthers, 318 U.S. 141 (1943).
247 438 U.S. at 748; id. at 759 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397
U.S. 728 (1970).
242 438 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School
Dist., 99 S. Ct. 693, 696 (1979) ("Having opened his office door to petitioner, the principal was
hardly in a position to argue that he was the 'unwilling recipient' of her views.") (emphasis in
original).
249 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
210 See 438 U.S. at 748-49; id. at 760 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Prior to Pacifica, the Court always used the ability to avoid a second, or
continued, exposure to the unwanted communication as the test for audience
captivity. Thus, the applicable test has been whether the unwilling recipients
"could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities .... "251
The first problem with using initial exposure as the criterion for captivity is
that it is a limitless invitation to governmental suppression of communication:
[T]his sort of "captivity" exists with respect to virtually all forms of
communication. While browsing through a newspaper, the un-
suspecting reader might unwittingly come across a headline or
photograph he finds offensive. . . . And while strolling through a
park, the individual may unintentionally overhear a speech or even a
conversation he finds indecent. Society cannot, however, spin a
protective cocoon around each individual, insulating him absolutely
from all unwanted communications. The true measure of an
individual's privacy in this context consists, not in his total protection
from initial exposure to unwelcome ideas, but, rather, in his ability to
avoid continued exposure to those ideas once he has rejected
them.2
52
The second reason why the ability to avoid initial exposure to an unwanted
message is an inappropriate criterion for audience captivity is that there exists
a significant free speech interest in allowing a speaker an opportunity to
arouse interest in his message by introducing it to a potentially willing listener:
"The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the
minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their
attention."253 In the same way that the right of free expression would be
rendered worthless if speakers were confined to a "speaker's corner" of a
park, it would likewise be rendered impotent in today's anonymous and busy
society if a speaker is not afforded the opportunity to capture the attention of a
potential audience. It is for precisely this reason that the Court's prior
decisions, holding that there is no audience captivity where there exists the
ability to avoid continued exposure to unwanted communication, either by
averting the eyes or ears2 5 4 or by turning off the radio, 255 strike the proper
accommodation between the competing societal interests in freedom of
speech and the freedom not to listen.
The final factor which should be considered is the degree to which the
rights of willing listeners are infringed by a particular governmental
regulation designed to protect unwilling listeners. Willing listeners possess a
constitutional right of their own to receive information, and the Court has
always been solicitous of this right.25 Whenever possible, the Court has
2'1 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added). See also Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 210-11; Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 412.
152 Stone, supra note 241, at 267.
253 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. at 87.
254 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 210-11; Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at
412; Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 21.
2- See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974); Rowan v. Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110 (1932).
256 See 438 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301,
305 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
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required that governmental regulations be narrowly tailored to protect the
unwilling listener without infringing upon the equally meritorious rights of
those who may wish to hear the speaker's message.
25 7
By considering the fourth factor in conjunction with the other relevant
considerations, it is readily apparent that Pacifica constitutes a sharp and
unjustifiable departure from the Court's own precedent in cases implicating
the interest in freedom from unwanted communication in the home. In
Rowan v. Post Office Department,258 the Court upheld a statute which
authorized recipients of unsolicited mail to enlist the aid of the United States
government to prevent additional mailings from the same sender. Pacifica
relied heavily on Rowan in justifying its proscription of the broadcast of the
Carlin monologue, but the differences between the two cases are so great that
Rowan offers little support for the Court's decision in Pacifica. Unlike Pacifica,
the statute at issue in Rowan made no attempt to prevent the initial exposure
of the unconsenting recipient but only prohibited continuing mailings after
the individual, on the basis of the first mailing, affirmatively registered an
objection. 259 The statute in Rowan was also content-neutral insofar as the
government was concerned. The statute on its face applied only to erotically
arousing or sexually provocative material, but the determination of whether a
mailing was within this category was left to the "complete and unfettered
discretion" of the recipient. 2 0 In order to avoid the difficult constitutional
questions which would arise if the government was given any authority to act
on the basis of the content of the materials, the statute empowered the
homeowner to "prohibit the mailing of a dry goods catalog because he objects
to the contents."2 6' Finally, the Court made it clear that this expansive power
to prevent unwanted communication in Rowan was constitutionally
permissible because the unwilling recipient was given no authority under the
statute to prevent mailings to any household other than his own.
26 2
A second possible situation, illustrated by Martin v. City of Struthers,263 is
where the government attempts, on a content-neutral basis, to protect the
interest of the unwilling recipient by prohibiting communication to an entire
community. In Martin the Court invalidated an ordinance which prohibited
all door-to-door distribution of handbills or circulars on the grounds that it
"substitute[d] the judgment of the community for the judgment of the
individual householder" and thus infringed upon the right of willing recipients
to receive such handbill distributions.
264
In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe 65 the Court vacated an
injunction prohibiting the distribution of literature in a residential communi-
257 See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
258 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
259 Id. at 729-30.
260 Id. at 734.
261 Id. at 737.
202 Id. at 736-37.
2- 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
214 Id. at 144. The Court suggested that the less drastic alternative of an ordinance prohibiting
door-to-door distribution to those who have previously expressed a desire to remain undisturbed
would pass constitutional muster. Id. at 148.
265 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
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ty. Here, one step removed from Martin, the individual, a real estate broker
accused of engaging in blockbusting practices by picketers in front of his
home, attempted to invoke a content-neutral governmental regulation in
order to vindicate a content-based interest in being free from the presentation
of the picketers' message in front of his home. The Supreme Court's response
was succinct: "Rowan . .. ,relied on by respondent, is not on point; the right
of privacy involved in that case is not shown here. Among other important
distinctions, respondent is not attempting to stop the flow of information into
his own household, but to the public.
2 66
Finally, there is the situation, analogous to that found in Pacifica, where
two crucial factors coincide. First, "the government, acting as censor,
undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that they are more offensive than others. '26 7 When the government's
interest in protecting the unwilling listener is based on the content of the
expression, "the First Amendment strictly limits its power. '" 268 Second, the
governmental regulation prohibits both willing and unwilling recipients from
receiving the communication. Here, it was clear that, prior to Pacifica, the
governmental regulation cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. Thus, in
Lamont v. Postmaster General26 the Court invalidated a statute which
required the Postmaster General to detain Communist political propaganda,
notify the addressee, and deliver it only upon receipt of an authorizing
postcard from the intended recipient. If the government cannot constitu-
tionally impose the slight burden of returning a postcard on a willing recip-
ient in order to protect unwilling recipients from the content of material the
government finds inappropriate, then it is difficult to comprehend how the
extensive burden placed on willing listeners by Pacifica can be constitutional-
ly justified. Indeed, the observation of Justice Brennan seems irrefutable:
The Court's balance, of necessity, fails to accord proper weight
to the interests of listeners who wish to hear broadcasts the FCC
deems offensive. It permits majoritarian tastes completely to
preclude a protected message from entering the homes of a
receptive, unoffended minority. No decision of this Court supports
such a result. Where the individuals comprising the offended
majority may freely choose to reject the material being offered, we
have never found their privacy interests of such moment to warrant
the suppression of speech on privacy grounds.
27
V. CONCLUSION
In Pacifica, the Supreme Court had a unique opportunity to confront the
chasm which exists between our nation's long and honored tradition of free
expression and the anomalous regulation of the content of broadcast
expression administered by the Federal Communications Commission.
266 Id. at 420.
267 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 209.
268 Id.
269 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
270 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Rather than attempting to offer a rational justification for the differential
treatment of the broadcast media, the Court begged the question by
identifying two factors, the presence of children and the presence of
unwilling adults, which characterize the broadcast media, and then relied
upon the existence of those two factors as a rationale for avoiding judicial
inquiry into their sufficiency as grounds for suppressing the content of
expression found distasteful by the FCC. In addition, the Court, contrary to
fundamental free speech theory, endorsed an expansive bureaucratic
framework for the control of the content of broadcast expression by
administrative censors. Instead of construing the governing statutes
consistently with our national tradition of unfettered expression, the Court
gave them a dubious construction, granting the FCC more authority over the
discussion of public issues on the airwaves than the agency ever believed it
possessed. Sadly, the result of Pacifica is "the worst of all possible worlds.
There is official lip service to freedom of the press in broadcasting but no
agreement that there is anything the Commission cannot do."27'
Hopefully, Pacifica will be limited to its particular facts and classified by
courts and commentators alike as an unfortunate aberration. Nevertheless,
the Court's cavalier violation of the principle of construing statutes so as to
avoid questions of constitutional magnitude, surprising indifference to its own
free speech precedents, and appalling insensitivity to first amendment
doctrines, values, and traditions bodes ill for the future.
271 Kalven, supra note 1, at 37-38.
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